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A PERSUASIVE VICTORY FOR NON-PERSUADERS
[Donovan v. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1985)]
INTRODUCTION
Every year, employers retain labor lawyers to serve as labor rela-
tions consultants., For example, when an employer is faced with a
potentially damaging union organization campaign, it may retain
lawyers to obtain a favorable outcome. 2 Often the activities of labor
relations consultants directly violate the employees' protected
rights.3 To counter this problem, Congress enacted the Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 to regulate
and make public the activities of labor relations consultants.4 The
LMRDA requires an attorney to file certain reports and disclosures
when the attorney is retained to persuade employees in decisions re-
garding the organiztion of unions or the collective bargaining
process .5
In Donovan v. Rose Law Firm, 6 a case of first impression, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals considered the extent to which a lawyer
must report and disclose information regarding his persuader activi-
ties. 7 In Rose Law Firm, the law firm performed persuader services
for the Monark Boat Company. 8 The Department of Labor subse-
quently contacted the Rose Law Firm, asking for reports and disclo-
1. See Bernstein, Union Busting: From Benign Neglect to Malignant Growth, 14 U.C.D.
L. REV. 3, 7 (1980).
2. Id. at 4.
3. For example of an illegal activity is occurs when such lawyers arrange for
employers to enter into "sweetheart" contracts with union leaders in order to assure
employers that there will be scapegoats from rank-and-file members. See Bernstein,
What You Can and Cannot Do Under LMRDA, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR MANAGE-
MENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, 1119, 1135 (Slovenko ed.
1961)[hereinafter cited as SyMposiuM](sweetheart contract is a deal between the em-
ployer and the union to abrogate the rights of the employees.)
4. LMRDA §§ 203(b), (c); (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 433(b), (c) (1982)).
5. For the complete text of 29 U.S.C. § 433(b), see infra note 31.
6. 768 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1985).
7. Id. at 967. "Persuader" activity is statutorily defined in 29 U.S.C. § 433(b).
For a discussion of what constitutes "persuader" activity, see infro notes 34-35 and
accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit defines a persuader as a person "who enters
into 'an agreement or arrangement with an employer' an object of which is (1) to
persuade employees as to the exercise or manner of exercising their collective bar-
gaining rights, or (2) to supply the employer with information regarding certain ac-
tivities of employees or a labor organization." Price v. Wirtz, 412 F.2d 647, 647-48
n.2 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
8. See id. at 965-66.
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sures encompassing not only the firm's involvement with Monark,
but also all labor relations advice and services performed for any
other clients.9
Reversing the district court, 10 the Eighth Circuit held that a lawyer
is not required to report receipts and disbursements on account of
labor services rendered to employers for whom the reporting lawyer
has not performed persuader activities.'I
Rose Law Firm is significant because the Eighth Circuit, wholly and
logically, disagreed with four other circuit court decisions.12 The
Eighth Circuit's holding alters an apparent trend toward broad re-
porting and disclosure requirements.'3 Lawyers in the Eighth Cir-
cuit practicing labor law, and performing persuader activities in
particular, are still required to disclose their persuader activities to
the Secretary of Labor. But, where only labor-related advice and
services are rendered for different clients, absent persuader activi-
ties, no report is required.14
In addressing the correctness of Rose Law Firm, this Comment fo-
cuses on the Eighth Circuit's application of the relevant sections on
reporting and disclosure, as well as exemptions and qualifications.
The legislative intent behind the reporting requirement is also em-
phasized. First, the Comment discusses the background of the
LMRDA, highlighting its purpose and legislative history. Next, the
Comment reviews the facts of Rose Law Firm and discusses the Eighth
Circuit's analysis. Then, the Comment discusses the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' misinterpretations of
the LMRDA. Finally, the Comment analyzes the Eighth Circuit deci-
sion from two perspectives: labor reform and legitimate attorney-cli-
ent relations.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE LMRDA
A. Purpose and History of the Act
With the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
(NLRA), 15 the government responded to an urgent need to address
9. Id. at 966.
10. Id. The lower court decision was rendered by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in an unreported opinion. Id.
11. Id. at 975.
12. See, e.g., Humphreys, Hutcheson & Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211 (6th
Cir. 1985); Master Printers Ass'n v. Donovan, 699 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Price, 412 F.2d at 647; Douglas v. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30 (4th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966).
13. See Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 975.
14. Id.
15. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
[Vol. 12
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the unfair advantage that management possessed over unions.16 As
government began to regulate the collective bargaining process,'7
employees' rights to organize unions and bargin collectively were
guaranteed.18 In the years following enactment of the NLRA, unfair
anti-labor activities declined.19 Unions grew quickly as collective
bargaining became a standard practice in labor-management
relations .20
Following World War II, the power of organized labor continued
to grow, as did the propensity to exert such power.2' There was
growing national concern that labor leaders were involved in mis-
conduct and corruption within the labor movement as well as with
employers. As a result, the McClellan Committee22 was authorized
to investigate the extent of any criminal or improper activities by la-
bor leaders and employers.23 The Committee found evidence of vio-
lence and conspiracy among certain union leaders acting in collusion
with employers.24
Although the main thrust of the Committee's findings dealt with
16. See Beaird, Reporting Requirements for Employers and Labor Relations Consultants in
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 53 GEo. L.J. 267, 268, 279
(1965).
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 157 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organizaton as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3)
of this title.
Id. In addition, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) provides that "[iut shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." Id.
19. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 3 (following passage of NLRA, tactics such as
employers' use of spies, Pinkerton guards, guns, and goons disappeared or
subsided).
20. See generally id.; Beaird, supra note 16, at 268.
21. See Gross, The Evolution of American Labor Law, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at
4 ("power has shifted from the members [of unions] to the leaders, as specialized and
technical responsibilities brought forward union leaders who are much more like the
organization men they 'bargain' with, and this has affected their attitudes towards the
rank and file with what one commentator has called a touch of paternalism").
22. The "McClellan Committee" refers to the Select Committee on Improper
Activities in the Labor and Management Field, SenatorJohn McClellan of Arkansas,
Chairman.
23. "[The Committee] was authorized.., to conduct an investigation and study
the extent to which criminal or other improper practices . . . are, or have been, en-
gaged in the field of labor-management relations." Beaird, supra note 16, at 269.
24. See S. REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
1986]
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the internal functioning of labor unions,25 the Committee discovered
abuses by employers using third-party middlemen to control or to
influence employees exercising their rights during labor disputes. 26
In its first interim report, the Committee strongly suggested that leg-
islation be enacted to curb the activities of these middlemen by re-
quiring full disclosure and reporting of their agreements with
employers regarding the employees' rights to organize and bargain
collectively.27
As a result of the McClellan Committee's recommendation, Sena-
tors Kennedy and Ives co-sponsored a labor-management reform
bill.28 Passed by the Senate but not the House,29 the bill contained
the initial versionSO of section 203(b) of the LMRDA31 which re-
25. See Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 851, 886 (1960).
26. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1959), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1959, at 406
(1959) [hereinafter cited as 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA]. The McClellan
Committee report describes management middlemen "flitting about the country on
behalf of employers to defeat attempts at labor organization." Id.
27. Id.
28. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [hereinafter cited as "Kennedy-Ives"].
29. Leiter, LIRDA and Its Setting, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 12. "[U]nder
the guidance ofJohn F. Kennedy, the Kennedy-Ives Bill passed the Senate, but fac-
tional differences and conflicting pressures prevented passage in the House." Id. at
14.
30. Section 103(b) of the Kennedy-Ives bill reads as follows:
Every person engaged in providing labor relations consultant service to an
employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce pursuant to any agree-
ment or arrangement under which such consultant undertakes-
(A) to influence or affect employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or
by the Railway Labor Act, as amended, or
(B) to provide an employer involved in a labor dispute with the serv-
ices of paid informants or investigators, or any agency or instrumentality
engaged in the business of interfering with, restraining, or coercing employ-
ees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, bv the Railway Labor Act, as amended, or (sic)
shall file annually a report with the Secretary, signed by its president and
treasurer or corresponding principal officers, containing the following infor-
mation:
(1) the name under which the labor relations consultant is engaged in
doing business and the address of its principal place of business;
(2) receipts of any kind from employers on account of labor relations
advice or services, designating the sources thereof;
(3) disbursements of any kind, in connection with such services and
the purposes thereof; and
(4) a detailed statement of such agreement or arrangement.
Provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to require a report
from a labor relations consultant retained bv an employer by reason of his
giving advice to such employer or representing such employer in any court
or administrative agency or engaging in collective bargaining on behalf of
such employer with respect to wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of
[Vol. 12
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quires lawyers acting as labor relations consultants to report and dis-
close agreements.
With the adoption of the LMRDA, and specifically sections 203(b)
and (c), 3 2 Congress enacted legislation to curb the questionable ac-
tivities of lawyers hired by employers to perform persuader activi-
ties.33 "Persuader" activities are defined as those activities which
influence employees in their collective bargaining decisions, includ-
ing their choice of union representatives34 or to supply information
regarding employee activities to an employer.35
When the Eighty-Sixth Congress convened, Senators Kennedy and
Ervin36 introduced the Kennedy-Ervin bill.37 This bill followed the
Kennedy-Ives bill-with a few exceptions-in imposing reporting
employment or the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising
thereunder.
S. 3974, § 103(b), 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1958).
31. Section 203(b) of the LMRDA provides:
Every person who pursuant to any agreement or arrangement with an
employer undertakes activities where an object thereof is, directly or indi-
rectly-
(1) to persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise, or persuade
employees as to the manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing; or
(2) to supply an employer with information concerning the activities
of employees or a labor organization in connection with a labor dispute in-
volving such employer, except information for use solely in conjunction with
an administrative or arbitral proceeding or a criminal or civil judicial pro-
ceeding; shall file within thirty days after entering into such agreement or
arrangement a report with the Secretary, signed by its president and treas-
urer or corresponding principal officers, containing the name under which
such person is engaged in doing business and the address of its principal
office, and a detailed statement of the terms and conditions of such agree-
ment or arrangement. Every such person shall file annually, with respect to
each fiscal year during which payments were made as a result of such an
agreement or arrangement, a report with the Secretary, signed by its presi-
dent and treasurer or corresponding principal officers, containing a state-
ment (A) of its receipts of any kind from employers on account of labor
relations advice or services, designated the sources thereof, and (B) of its
disbursements of any kind, in connection with such services and the pur-
poses thereof. In each such case information shall be set forth in such cate-
gories as the Secretary may prescribe.
29 U.S.C. § 433(b)(l)-(2) (1982).
32. The LMRDA was passed by the House and the Senate and signed by the
President. 105 CONG. REC. 16653 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,. 1959, at 1738 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA ].
33. See supra note 7.
34. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 3-4. "Labor relations consultants advise em-
ployers on how to manipulate their employees' working lives and environment in
order to 'prevent' unions .... ." Id.
35. See id. at 16. For example, labor consultants may recommend taking "morale
surveys" for the purpose of determining union sympathizers. Id.
36. 105 CONG. REC. 816 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TilE
LMRDA, supra note 26, at 803, 968.
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and disclosure requirements upon lawyers who perform persuader
activities for employers. 38 The Kennedy-Ervin bill went to commit-
tee39 and was introduced for Senate consideration.40 During this pe-
riod, the House considered bills by Representative Elliot and
Representatives Landrum and Griffin.41 The House called up the
Landrum-Griffin bill as a substitute for the Elliot bill,42 and then sub-
stituted the text of the Elliot bill for the Senate bill.43 The House
then held a conference with the Senate to resolve the differences be-
tween the two bills.44 The measure was approved by the confer-
ence,45 reported by the House conferees,46 and passed by both the
Senate and the House. 47
B. Statutory Analysis
Thus, the LMRDA is literally a "patchwork" of bills considered by
both houses,48 as well as by the President.49 The bill contains sec-
37. See S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LMRDA, supra note 26, at 29-79.
38. See S. 505, § 103(b). For the complete text of § 103(b), see infra note 68.
39. The Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 4600
(1959); see 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA , supra note 32, at 1015.
40. 105 CONG. REC. at 4618, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA,
supra note 32, at 1015 (at this point the Kennedy-Ervin bill was given a new number -
S. 1555).
41. 105 CONG. REC. 13,125 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LMRDA, supra note 32, at 1527.
42. The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor, together with
the minority, supplemental, and individual views of the committee members, were
issued onJuly 30, 1959. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959), reprinted
in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 26, at 759-864. On August 13,
1959, the measure was again approved in a final vote of 229 to 201. 105 CONG. REC.
14519-20 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 32, at
1691-92.
43. 105 CONG. REC. 14,540 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LMRDA, supra note 32, at 1701-02.
44. Id. at 14,555, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note
32, at 1702.
45. H. REP, No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LRMDA, supra note 32, at 934.
46. Id. at 934.
47. 105 CONG. REC. 16,435, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 967 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 32, at 1452-53 (Senate approval of con-
ference report); id. at 16,653-54, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA,
supra note 32, at 1738-39 (House approval of conference report).
48. Comment, Local 82, Furniture .Moving Drivers v. Crouwlev: .- Restatement of Institu-
tional Power Under Titles I and Il'of the L.1IRDA, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 181 (1984), states
that:" '[r]eporting and disclosure' alludes to only one of [LMRDA's] seven titles- and
'Landrum-Griffin' immortalizes not its most substantive contributors but rather the
compilers of the composite bill that most closely resembled the final enactment." Id.
at 183.
49. S. Doc. No. 10, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
[Vol. 12
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tions which have proven both confusing and conflicting.50 Hence, a
proper analysis of sections 203(b) and (c) must begin by analyzing
the legislative intent and structure of each proposed bill prior to the
enactment of the final legislation. By analyzing the various compo-
nents, the "patchwork" is better understood.
Section 203(b) of the LMRDA was included to regulate the activi-
ties of lawyers.51 Two activities will trigger the reporting require-
ment. When an agreement is made between the lawyer and the
employer to "persuade" employees about their organization and col-
lective bargaining rights, or to inform employers of their employees'
labor activities, a report must be filed within thirty days with the Sec-
retary of Labor.52 The report must detail the terms and conditions
of the agreement or arrangement. 53 An additional report is required
to be filed annually, stating the receipts and disbursements in con-
nection with labor relations advice and services and the purpose
thereof.54
Section 203(c) of the LMRDA explains that nothing in section 203
"shall be construed to require any employer or other person to file a
report covering the services of such person by reason of his giving or
agreeing to give advice . . ... "55 In addition, section 203(c) does
not require a report from a lawyer representing an employer in la-
bor-related legal functions.56
Section 203(b), thus, applies to any person who has, in any particu-
lar year, engaged in any persuader activities with employees, or acted
in the capacity as an informant for an employer. Such person must
file a report including all receipts and disbursements in connection
with any advice and services rendered for all labor employers in the
HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 27, at 80-83 (Eisenhower's 20 Point Program to
Eliminate Abuses and Improper Practices in Labor-Management Relations).
50. See Comment, supra note 48, at 183-87.
51. "The middlemen have acted, in fact if not in law, as agents of management."
S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LMRDA, supra note 26, at 406.
52. See LMRDA § 203(b), 29 U.S.C. § 433(b)(l)-(2) (1982).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. LMRDA § 203(c) specifically provides:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any employer or
other person to file a report covering the services of such person by reason
of his giving or agreeing to give advice to such employer or representing or
agreeing to represent such employer before any court, administrative
agency, or tribunal of arbitration or engaging or agreeing to engage in col-
lective bargaining on behalf of such employer with respect to wages, hours,
or other terms or conditions of employment or the negotiation of an agree-
ment or any question arising thereunder.
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same fiscal year. 57 Subsection (c), however, appears to exempt a law-
yer from filing reports when the lawyer only gives or agrees to give
labor relations advice or when he represents an employer in related
legal functions.58
1. Conflict Between Subsections (b) and (c)
The conflict between subsections (b) and (c) arises when a lawyer,
in one fiscal year, performs or agrees to perform persuader activities
for one employer, and non-persuader activities for another em-
ployer.59 Reading subsections (b) and (c) together, there appears to
be two possible interpretations of subsection (c). One possible inter-
pretation is that subsection (c) excludes the reporting of advice only
if the lawyer has not performed both persuader activities and inform-
ant services for any employer. Such acts are reportable under sub-
section (b) for any labor relations employer.60 The second possible
interpretation is that subsection (c) excludes from the reporting re-
quirement only advice and services for employers for whom the law-
yer does not perform or agree to perform persuader or informant
activities.61 Upon a simple reading, a definite interpretation and rec-
onciliation of subsections (b) and (c) appears impossible. A progres-
sion, however, from the original labor reform act, the Kennedy-Ives
bill,62 through the first act as passed by Congress, indicates that the
second possibility is the only interpretation applicable.
2. Evolution of the Reporting Requirement
The initial version of sections 203(b) and (c) was originally section
103(b)63 of the Kennedy-Ives bill. Section 103(b) required attor-
neys, who attempted "to influence or affect" employees exercising
their rights, to file reports with the Secretary of Labor.64 Section
103(b) required the reporting of the lawyer's name, receipts and dis-
bursements of labor relations advice and services, and details of the
agreement.6 5 In addition, section 103(b) contained a provision stat-
ing that nothing in section 103 "shall be construed to require a re-
57. LMRDA § 203(b), 29 U.S.C. § 433(b)(1)-(2) (1982).
58. LMRDA § 203(c), 29 U.S.C. § 433(c) (1982).
59. See Aaron, supra note 25, at 891 ("This is another example of the ambiguities
produced by the inartistic draftmanship which characterizes much of the statute.").
60. LMRDA § 203(b), 29 U.S.C. § 433(b)(1)-(2) (1982). See Note, Two Views of a
Labor Relations Consultant's Duty to Report Under Section 203 of the LMRDA, 65 MICH. L.
REV. 752, 754 (1967).
61. Note, supra note 63, at 754. LMRDA § 203(b), 29 U.S.C. § 433(b)(1)-(2)
(1982).
62. S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1958).
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port from a labor relations consultant . . .by reason of his giving
advice . . . or representing such employer . *..."66 By its very
terms, section 103(b) qualified the reporting requirement for law-
yers. According to the Senate Report which accompanied the Ken-
nedy-Ives bill, this qualification was a proviso to guard against
misconstruction, "merely making an implicit point explicit."67
The Kennedy-Ervin bill,68 which followed Kennedy-Ives, con-
tained similar language on the reporting requirements for lawyers.
There was, however, a change in the structure of section 103. Signif-
icantly, what had been a mere proviso in the Kennedy-Ives bill, was
set out in a separate subsection in the Kennedy-Ervin bill.69 Section
103(c) of the Kennedy-Ervin bill became the language of section
66. Id.
67. See S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958), reprinted in 22 U.S. REP.
& Doc. (1958) ("although this would be the meaning of the language of sections
103(a) and (b) in any event, a proviso to section 103(b) guards against
misconstruction.").
68. The Kennedy-Ervin bill states, in relevant part:
(b) Every person engaged in providing labor relations consultant ser-
vice to an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce pursuant to
any agreement or arrangement under which such consultant undertakes ac-
tivities where an object thereof is, directly or indirectly-
(A) to persuade employees not to exercise, or persuade employ-
ees as to the manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing;
(B) to supply an employer with information concerning the activi-
ties of employees or a labor organization in connection with a labor dispute,
except information for use solely in conjunction with a judicial, administra-
tive or arbitral proceeding, shall file annually a report with the Secretary,
signed by its president and treasurer or corresponding principal officers,
containing the following information:
(1) the name under which the labor relations consultant is
engaged in doing business and the address of its principal place of business;
(2) receipts of any kind from employers on account of labor
relations advice or services, designating the sources thereof;
(3) disbursements of any kind, in connection with such serv-
ices and the purposes thereof; and
(4) a detailed statement of the terms of such agreement or
arrangement.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any employer
or a labor relations consultant to file a report covering the services of a con-
sultant by reason of his giving or agreeing to give advice to such employer
or representing or agreeing to represent such employer before any court,
administrative agency or tribunal of arbitration or engaging or agreeing to
engage in collective bargaining on behalf of such employer with respect to
wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment or the negotia-
tion of an agreement or any question arising thereunder.
S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-14 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LMRDA, supra note 26, at 40-42.
69. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LMRDA, supra note 26, at 31-32. A relatively minor change occurred in the req-
uisite action which "triggers" the reporting requirement. See Kennedy-Ives bill, supra
note 30. "To influence or affect" was replaced by "to persuade" employees. See Kennedy-
Ervin bill, supra note 68.
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203(c) of the LMRDA.70 The Kennedy-Ervin bill went to Committee
and was reintroduced to the Senate as S. 1555.7' The Senate passed
it by a vote of ninety to one.
7 2
The House Committee on Education and Labor considered many
bills, including Kennedy-Ervin.73 The original Landrum-Griffin bill
was called up as a substitute for the Elliot bill.74 The reporting re-
quirements and their qualifications and exemptions were nearly
identical. The text of the original Landrum-Griffin bill was then sub-
stituted for Kennedy-Ervin. 75 The House then added a section ex-
cluding confidential information between an attorney and his client
"in the course of a legitimate attorney-client relationship." 76 Confi-
dential relations included, but were not limited to, "the relationship
of attorney and client, the financial details thereof, or any informa-
tion obtained, advice given, or activities carried on by the attorney
within the scope of the legitimate practice of law."77
II. THE ROSE LAw FIRM DECISION
A. Facts
In August, 1980, the Rose Law Firm entered into an agreement
with the Monark Boat Company to provide legal advice regarding
the union organizing activities of the United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America (Union).78 During the course of
the Union organizing activities, a lawyer from the Rose Law Firm
70. Compare § 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE LMRDA, with LMRDA § 203(c), 29 U.S.C. § 433(c) (1982).
71. H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LMRDA, supra note 26, at 619-86; 105 CONG. REC. 13,125 (1959), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 32, at 1527.
72. 105 CONG. REC. 6,048 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LMRDA, supra note 32, at 1257.
73. Id. at 6,399, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 32,
at 1481. The section on reporting requirements was very similar, but other sections
of the Landrum-Griffin bill, irrelevant here, were more favorable to the House. See
Aaron, supra note 25, at 860.
74. H.R. REP. No. 741 on H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959), reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 26, at 759.
75. 105 CONG. REC. 14,395 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LMRDA, supra note 32, at 1646-98, 1651-55.
76. LMRDA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 434 (1982). Section 204 provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to require an attorney
who is a member in good standing of the bar of any State, to include in any
report required to be filed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter any
information which was lawfully communicated to such attorney by any of his
clients in the course of a legitimate attorney-client relationship.
Id.
77. H. REP. No. 741 on H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1959), reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 26, at 795.
78. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 965.
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conducted discussions with employees of the Monark Boat Com-
pany. 79 The Department of Labor considered these discussions to
be persuader activites under section 203(b) of the LMRDA.80
The Department of Labor subsequently contacted the Rose Law
Firm requesting that they file the necessary reporting forms.81 After
two years, the firm filed forms for its work for the Monark Boat Com-
pany, but refused the Secretary's demand that they file disclosure re-
ports regarding labor relations advice and services rendered to other
employers. 82 The Department of Labor then filed suit against the
Rose Law Firm seeking an order from the district court compelling
the firm to comply with the reporting requirement.83 In June of
1984, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Department
of Labor.84
B. Analysis
Not surprisingly, the Eighth Circuit stated that a mere reading of
the language of sections 203(b) and (c) does not clearly indicate a
preferred statutory interpretation.85 Instead, the court examined the
relevant legislative history to determine the congressional intent.86
First, the court compared section 203(c) of the LMRDA, as ulti-
mately adopted, to the initial proposal in the Kennedy-Ives bill.87
The proviso to section 103(b) of the Kennedy-Ives bill states that
"[n]othing in this act shall be construed to require a report from a
labor relations consultant retained by an employer by reason of his
giving advice . "88 The comparable portion of the LMRDA
states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require
any employer or other person to file a report covering the services of such
person by reason of his giving or agreeing to give advice .... 89
The court stressed that the additional language of section 203(c) is
significant because the proviso of section 103(b) merely defines
when a report is not required.90 On the other hand, section 203(c)
79. Id.
80. See supra text and accompanying notes 31-32.
81. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 965.
82. Brief for Appellee at IX-X, Donovan v. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d 964 (8th
Cir. 1985) (copy on file at the William Mitchell Law Review office).
83. Id. at X.
84. Id.
85. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 970. This is another example of the ambiguities
caused by the inarticulate draftsmanship which characterizes much of the statute. See
Aaron, supra note 25, at 891.
86. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 967.
87. Id. at 970.
88. Kennedy-Ives, supra note 30.
89. LMRDA § 203(c), 29 U.S.C. § 433(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
90. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 971.
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of the LMRDA "specifically refers to, and places limitations on, the
content of the report required by section 203(b)." 9 1
The additional language first appeared in section 103(c) of the
Kennedy-Ervin bill.92 Though the addition was similar to the lan-
guage of section 103(b) of the Kennedy-Ives bill, the court found
that the bill's addition was not a proviso intended to make an implicit
point explicit.93 Instead, the court found that section 103(c) of the
Kennedy-Ervin bill appeared to be a broad-based exception to the
reporting requirement of the Kennedy-Ives bill.94.
When the Kennedy-Ervin bill reemerged as S. 1555, it was accom-
panied by Senate Report No. 187.95 In determining that the lan-
guage of section 103(c) of S. 1555 was indeed a broad-based
exception, the court noted that Senate Report No. 1684,96 which ac-
companied the Kennedy-Ives bill, indicated that the proviso of sec-
tion 103(b) was a clarification of the reporting requirement.9
7
Senate Report No. 187 did not "carry forward the thought" that sec-
tion 103(c) of S. 1555 was simply a mirror of section 103(b) of Ken-
nedy-Ives bill.98 The court found this omission from Senate Report
No. 187 significant.99 The court continued to focus on a narrower
reporting requirement by finding a broader exemption.
The court believed, however, that the best indication of legislative
intent of sections 203(b) and (c) was the Conference Committee Re-
port on the LMRDA. t00 The conference report states that section
203(c) grants an attorney rendering labor advice "a broad exemption
from the requirements of the [LMRDA]."IoI The court was faced
91. Id. (emphasis in original).
92. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LMRDA, supra note 26, at 41.
93. See Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 973.
94. Id. at 974.
95. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 26, at 397.
96. S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958), reprinted in 22 U.S. REP. &
Doc. (1958).
97. Id. at 9, reprinted in 22 U.S. REP. & Doc. (1958).
98. See Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 972. Senate Report No. 187 states:
An attorney or consultant who confines himself to giving legal advice, taking
part in collective bargaining and appearing in court or administrative pro-
ceedings would not be included among those required to file reports under
this subsection. Specific exemption for persons giving this type of advice is con-
tained in subsection c of section 103.
S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LMRDA, supra note 26, at 408 (emphasis added).
99. See Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 972.
100. Id. at 974; see also H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959), reprinted
in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1.MRDA, supra note 26, at 934.
101. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISIA-
TIVE HISTORY OF TIlE LMRDA, supra note 26, at 934.
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with interpreting legislative intent using either the Senate Report of
the Kennedy-Ives bill, or the conference report on the final version
of the LMRDA. The court believed it a better practice to choose the
latter. 102
The Eighth Circuit was further persuaded by "what appears to
have been a deliberate choice by Congress to introduce an element
of congruity into [all] the reporting requirements of the
LMRDA."103 That is, the court believed that the required reports of
one party in an agreement should mirror other reports filed by any
other party in the agreement. The court found that an employer was
not required to file a report when he sought only labor relations ad-
vice from an attorney.1 0 4 The court believed that if Congress de-
sired congruous results, then it was "unlikely that Congress intended
to require the content of reports by persuaders under section 203(b)
and (c) to be so broad as to encompass dealings with employers who
are not required to make any report whatsoever under section
203(a) (4)."105
III. ANALYSIS OF OTHER CIRCUITS
Prior to Rose Law Firm, four circuit courts of appeals considered
the extent to which a lawyer was required to file reports when, in the
same fiscal year, he performed both traditional labor consultant ac-
tivities as well as persuader activities for separate employers.106 The
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals all relied
102. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 974.
103. Id.
104. Id. Section 203(a)(4) of the LMRDA provides:
(a) Every employer who in any fiscal year made-
. . . (4) any agreement or arrangement with a labor relations consultant or
other independent contractor or organization pursuant to which such per-
son undertakes activities where an object thereof, directly or indirectly, is to
persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise, or persuade employees
as to the manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, or undertakes to supply such
employer with information concerning the activities of employees or a labor
organization in connection with a labor dispute involving such employer,
except information for use solely in conjunction with an administrative or
arbitral proceeding or a criminal or civil judicial proceeding;
shall file with the Secretary a report, in a form prescribed by him, signed by
its president and treasurer or corresponding principal officers showing in
detail the date and amount of each such payment, loan, promise, agreement,
or arrangement and the name, address, and position, if any, in any firm or
labor organization of the person to whom it was made and a full explanation
of the circumstances of all such payments, including the terms of any agree-
ment or understanding pursuant to which they were made.
LMRDA § 203(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 433(a)(4) (1982).
105. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 975.
106. See Humphre'Vs, 755 F.2d at 1216; Master Printers, 699 F.2d at 371; Price, 412
F.2d at 651; Douglas, 353 F.2d at 32.
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on the early legislative history and principles of statutory construc-
tion in order to reconcile the conflict between the language of sec-
tions 203(b) and (c) of the LMRDA.107 These circuits held that
reports and disclosures were required for all labor clients once a law-
yer has performed or agreed to perform persuader activities for any
client. 108
The first court to face the problem of interpretation of sections
203(b) and (c) of the LMRDA was the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Douglas v. Wirtz. 109 The Fourth Circuit held that subsection
(c) excludes the advice or representation by a lawyer from subsection
(b)'s reporting requirement only if the lawyer has performed no sub-
section (b) activities for any employer.I10 The court reasoned that
the word "advice" in and of itself does not create an obligation to
report. I 1 The court believed, however, that subsection (c), read to-
gether with subsection (b), required that both advice and persuader
activities must be reported when both are performed in the same
fiscal year.' 12 The court found this to be true when each is per-
formed for separate employers. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that to
hold otherwise would "suggest a misconstruction of the provi-
sion."113 "Advice" must therefore mean independent advice. Ac-
cordingly, a lawyer would not be required to report activities "by
reason of' the giving of independent advice., 14 However, if an obli-
gation arises by reason of persuader activity, then both persuader
activity and independent labor relations advice must be reported.
The court based its reasoning on the Senate Committee Report of
the Kennedy-Ives bill.' 15 The report stated the following:
an attorney or other consultant who confined himself to giving ad-
vice, taking part in collective bargaining and appearing in court
and administrative proceedings nor [sic] would such a consultant
be required to report. Although this would be the meaning of the
language of sections 103(a) and (b) in any event, aproviso to section
103(b) guards against misconstruction. 1 16
The issue was again resolved in favor of the Secretary of Labor in
107. See Humphreys, 755 F.2d at 1216-19; Price, 412 F.2d at 648-51; Douglas, 353
F.2d at 32-33; Master Printers v. Donovan, 532 F. Supp. 1144 (N.D. I1l. 1981).
108. See Humphreys, 755 F.2d at 1216-19; Price, 412 F.2d at 651; Douglas, 353 F.2d
at 32; Master Printers, 532 F. Supp. at 1147.
109. Douglas, 353 F.2d at 30.






116. S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958), reprinted in 22 U.S. REP. &
Doc. (1958) (emphasis added).
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Price v. Wirtz. 117 The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the Fourth Cir-
cuit's opinion.' 18 The court felt compelled to interpret sections
203(b) and (c) by using the Senate Report which accompanied the
Kennedy-Ives bill.'19 The court stressed that the legislative intent
was to publicize the activities of lawyers who participate in questiona-
ble labor relations practices.120
The Fifth Circuit believed that by publicizing persuader activities,
Congress intended to publicize all questionable activities of employ-
ers and the lawyers hired by them.121 The court believed such broad
exposure was justified because of the complexities in representing
corporate conglomerates.122 Like the Douglas court, the Fifth Circuit
held that if a lawyer limits himself to legitimate labor relations, and
performs no persuader activities, there is no duty to report his legiti-
mate activities. 123
In 1983, in Master Printers Association v. Donovan, 124 the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's narrow interpreta-
tion of section 203(c). The court held that lawyers must report all
advice given and services rendered for all labor clients, when the
consultant has become involved in persuader activities. 125 In Master
Printers, the district court stated that Congress was not addressing
117. 412 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1969). The dissent in Price was concerned that the
majority's holding would force lawyers to report and disclose information between a
lawyer/persuader and his non-persuader clients for whom no persuader activities
were performed. This would be the case whether the client had any knowledge of the
attorney's persuader activities, whether the client received advice or services before
or after the persuader activities, the advice or services were material or relevant, or
the client is ever aware of the persuader activities. The dissent stated:
It must be emphasized that the rights with which we are here concerned
are fundamental First and Fourth Amendment rights. That labor relations
employers have the right to speak to attorneys regarding their business la-
bor relations, to associate with attorneys for lawful legal advice, and to have
private affairs of a lawful nature protected from governmental intrusion is
beyond dispute. That the attorneys as well as the employers enjoy the same
rights seems also beyond dispute. That the particular matters, financial af-
fairs including the amounts and sources of receipts and the amounts and
purposes of disbursements, are of a confidential nature should be equally
clear. And that disclosure by the attorney must necessarily expose and af-
fect the client-employer is just as certain.
Price, 412 F.2d at 652-59. The court overruled Wirtz v. Fowler, 372 F.2d 315 (1966).
Price, 412 F.2d at 651. The Fifth Circuit sat en bone because of the significance of the
case. Id. Five of the judges dissented.
118. Price, 412 F.2d at 649.
119. Id. at 650 n.15.
120. Id. at 650; see lirtz, 372 F.2d at 334.
121. Price, 412 F.2d at 650.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 650-51.
124. 699 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1983).
125. Id. at 371.
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persuader activity in and of itself.J26 Rather, the court stated that
Congress believed that consultants who performed persuader activi-
ties tended to engage in questionably unfair labor practices.127
Therefore, to avoid concealing unfair labor practices under the guise
of labor advice or services, all activities of consultants acting as per-
suaders must be subject to public scrutiny.128 As did the previous
circuit courts, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Senate Report which
accompanied the Kennedy-Ives bill in determining that the proviso
of section 103(b) was intended merely to make an implicit point
explicit. 129
Finally, in Humphreys, Hutcheson & Moseley v. Donovan, 130 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed in relevant part with the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in Price. That is, that section 203(c) of the LMRDA
was a clarification of the reporting requirement of section 203(b),
and not an exemption from reporting.t3'
IV. DiSCUSSION
In Rose Law Firm, the Eighth Circuit correctly narrowed the report-
ing and disclosure requirement of section 203(b). The four circuit
courts that addressed the issue prior to Rose Law Firm were unable to
logically determine the clear statutory intent because they misinter-
preted key factors and indicators of the requirements of sections
203(b) and (c). An important consideration is simply that non-law-
yers who practice as labor relations consultants are not bound by
ethical considerations regarding confidentiality with their clients.
Understanding this, it becomes obvious that in enacting the LMRDA
and its relevant reporting and disclosure sections, Congress must
have intended proper exemptions for lawyers engaging in legitimate
labor relations with their clients.
A. Labor Reform
The Eighth Circuit succeeded in better interpreting the conflicting
sections of the LMRDA by thoroughly examining the progression of
the Kennedy-Ives bill to the LMRDA as finally enacted. An evolution
to a broad-based exemption to section 203(b) of the LMRDA ap-
126. Master Printers, 532 F. Supp. at 1150.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. See Master Printers, 699 F.2d at 371; see also ,M aster Printers, 532 F. Supp. at
1145-46.
130. 755 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1985). The lawv firm sought declaratory judgment
and an injunction against the Secretary of Labor in an action arising from a speech
made to employees by a law firm partner in connection with a union organizational
election. Id. at 1213-14.
131. Id. at 1215-16.
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pears more obvious in view of the additional language of section
103(c) of the Kennedy-Ervin bill and its accompanying committee
report which followed the reintroduction of S. 505 as S. 1555.132
The Senate Report stated that not all of the activities which section
103(b) required to be reported were illegal, but that most fell into a
"gray area." 33 The Committee felt that if a lawyer indulged in per-
suader activities, the activities should be reported.134 The commit-
tee recognized, however, that a lawyer who "confines himself to
giving legal advice" is exempt from the reporting requirements.t
35
This language supports the reasoning that a very broad exemption
to section 203(b)'s reporting requirement was being set forth.
If the activities of the lawyer fell within the gray area, they were
required to be reported. If, however, the activity was only that of a
legitimate and traditional labor consultant practice, then section
103(c) excluded the lawyer from the reporting requirement of sec-
tion 103(b). A further indication of the statutory exemption granted
by section 203(c) is the Conference Committee Report. 13 6 The Con-
ference Report states that section 203(c) grants "a broad exemption




The Conference Committee desired to exclude from subsection
203(b)'s requirement information arising in the course of traditional
attorney-client relationships.' 38 This desire is manifested in section
204. Section 204 provides that the LMRDA will not require an attor-
ney who is a member in good standing of the bar "to include in a
report . . . any information which is lawfully communicated to such
attorney by any of his clients in the course of a legitimate attorney-
client relationship." 139
In order to understand the significance of section 204 it is neces-
sary to keep in mind section 203(a)(4).140 Section 203 (a)(4) paral-
132. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1959), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 26, at 397.
133. Id. at 11, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ThE LMRDA, supra note 26, at
407.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 12, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THlE LMRDA, supra note 26, at
408.
136. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1959), reprinted in I LEGIStA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 26, at 937.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. LMRDA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 434. For the complete text of § 204, see supra
note 76.
140. LMRDA § 203(a)(4). 29 U.S.C. § 433(a)(4) (1982).
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lels section 203(b) which requires a lawyer to file reports. 141 Section
203(a)(4) requires an employer to report "any agreement or ar-
rangement with a labor relations consultant . .. to persuade
employees." 142
If an employer enters into an agreement or arrangement with a
lawyer which does not involve coercion or interference with the em-
ployees' rights to organize and bargain collectively, the employer is
not required to report the terms of that agreement.143 This is the
case, even though the employer may have, in the same year, retained
another lawyer to persuade employees.144 Section 204 still pre-
cludes the Secretary from requiring a report detailing any agreement
or arrangement between the lawyer and the employer for whom the
lawyer does not perform persuader activities. 145 In other words, the
lawyer performing non-persuader activities is not required to report
information regarding his agreement with that employer. The re-
porting requirements should not change merely by virtue of the fact
that in the same fiscal year, a lawyer may have performed persuader
activities for another client. To interpret sections 203(b) and (c)
otherwise requires a lawyer to file a report detailing the agreement
between the lawyer and an employer regarding information which is
not required to be reported by the employer and which arises within
"the course of a legitimate attorney-client relationship."146
CONCLUSION
The LMRDA is a successful piece of legislation which has greatly
protected union members from the dangers of collusion between
union leaders and management. The Act's reporting and disclosure
requirements and related exceptions, however, are examples of the
hasty efforts of Congress to pass a law while under great political
pressure. As a result, courts have been required to reconcile poor
draftsmanship and interpret an act comprised of the language of sev-
eral bills. The Eighth Circuit's holding is significant for lawyers prac-
ticing labor law, and those performing persuader activities in
particular. The Eighth Circuit's holding will protect both the lawyer
141. See LMRDA § 203(b), 29 U.S.C. § 433(b). For the text of the statute, see
supra note 31.
142. LMRDA § 203(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 433(a)(4).
143. Id. § 203(c), 29 U.S.C. § 433(c). "Yet, it is clear from the language of the Act
that an employer does not have to report the services ofa consultant from whom he
has taken 'advice,' say on the setting up of a union-busting campaign." Roosevelt.
LMRDA in the Congressional ireua. SVMosit;:. supra note 3. at 123, 129.
144. See LMRDA § 203(c), 29 U.S.C. § 433(c).
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and the non-persuader client for whom the lawyer provides labor-
related services.
The Eighth Circuit, in correctly interpreting section 203(b) and (c)
of the LMRDA, has forged ahead against decisions of four other cir-
cuits. Though this is a correct interpretation, Congress should elimi-
nate this confusion by amending the LMRDA to clearly state that
lawyers are not required to report non-persuader activities.
Bradley D. Lance
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